INDIA’S EASTERN POLICY

SINGAPORE- 1947, AND BEYOND

NEHRUVIAN FOREIGN POLICY: OPPORTUNITY LOST

SARASIJ MAJUMDER

BEFORE 1947

Singapore was founded by the British East India Company and for the first 50 years of its settlement, it was under the direct administration of British India. Even after Singapore was placed under  separate colonial control, it was assumed that British India would be primarily responsible for its security.

A broadly held acceptance prior to World War II was that the “natural” strategic sphere of British India covered the Indian Ocean, running from Aden to Singapore and beyond. Leading strategic thinkers from Lord Curzon to K.M.Panikkar recognized the strategic importance of Singapore to India as the eastern anchor of India’s maritime security and that India – whether British-controlled or independent – would be a principal security provider to Singapore (Curzon 1909; Panikkar 1943: 100-1).

The importance of Singapore as the eastern anchor to India’s maritime security was played out when the fall of Singapore to the Japanese in February 1942 (involving the surrender of some 40,000 Indian troops) was followed by the capture of the Andaman Islands in the Bay of Bengal, followed by the evacuation of the British fleet to Africa, exposing India’s entire eastern seaboard to invasion. The Japanese for various reasons were unwilling or unable to properly exploit this position. Mr. Subhash Chandra Bose , and INA then took control.

AFTER 1947

The granting of independence to India in 1947 and the subsequent decolonization of Southeast Asia led to a significant discontinuity in India’s perception of the region. The Nehruvian political philosophy that formed the foundation of Indian strategic doctrine largely eschewed a direct security role for India outside of South Asia.

Nehru gave relations with Southeast Asia a particularly low priority and in the Indian diplomatic service all postings in Southeast Asia were classified as “category C”, the least desirable and important in the diplomatic service hierarchy. At a 1961 meeting in New Delhi between Nehru and the Indian ambassadors to Southeast Asia, when one senior diplomat suggested that India should seek to nurture close relations with Southeast Asian, Nehru reportedly cut the ambassador short, declaring: “Do you gentlemen wish to become friendly with Coca Cola governments?” This reportedly ended any further discussion on the subject (Dixit 2004: 12). Although Nehru’s Fabian socialist disdain for the strategic concerns of Southeast Asian states was progressively moderated under Indira Gandhi and successive Indian leaders, the basic temper of the relationship had been established and would to some extent remain until the early 1990s.

 As a result--USA, and later CHINA filled the VACUUM.

SINGAPORE’S FOLLOW UP:

Singaporeans continued to recognise a legitimate role for India as a regional security provider in what has been called Singapore’s “survival phase” in the years following independence, Singapore saw itself as being in a precarious strategic position, concerned not only with the prospect of Communist Chinese supported internal subversion but also with external threats posed by Indonesia and a potentially revanchist Malaysia. Singapore saw India as potentially helping to maintain its new-found sovereignty against infringements by China as well as its large neighbours. During the 1960s, Singapore made several attempts to develop a security relationship with India. However, while India was willing to provide diplomatic assistance to the newly independent Singapore in developing international relations, it showed little, or no interest in acting as a security provider (Lee 2000: 450).

In 1965, Lee Kuan Yew made a request to Indian Prime Minister Shastri for Indian assistance in training the newly-established Singapore army. The Indians declined to even respond to the request. Ultimately, Singapore obtained support from ISRAEL.

In May 1968, following the announcement of the withdrawal of the British navy from Singapore, Lee again unsuccessfully sought to encourage an Indian military presence in Singapore, proposing to Indira Gandhi that the Indian navy should take over the Royal Navy’s regional security role, including making use of Singaporean naval dockyard facilities for the building and repair of ships (Suryanarayan 2008). When, during a visit to India in 1970, Lee asked Indira Gandhi whether India intended to extend its naval influence into Southeast Asia, the Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh responded that India’s greater interest was in keeping its western sea lanes open (Lee 2000: 452).

Following the first Chinese Lop Nur nuclear test in October 1964 – even before Singapore’s formal independence – the ever-quotable Lee Kuan Yew reportedly suggested to visiting Indian dignitaries and journalists that India should also explode a nuclear bomb, “at least for the sake of Southeast Asia, even if she wanted to throw it into the sea later” (Dutt 1984: 256). In 1966, Lee proposed that India should adopt an “Asian Monroe Doctrine” to prevent “poaching” in Asia. Lee added that India was the ideal candidate to fulfil such as role because it conducted its foreign policy “on a basis of equality and not on a basis of power relations”(Straits Times, 3 September 1966). Singapore also reportedly tried to encourage India to join ASEAN upon its formation in 1967, perhaps with a view to finding a balance with large states within that grouping. However, other ASEAN states were not in favour of  India’s inclusion.

India’s opposition to involvement in any regional security mechanism puzzled the Singaporeans and others in Southeast Asia , particularly in light of shared perceptions of a threat from China. To Southeast Asians, India’s persistent downplaying of any idea of a power vacuum and statements about the uselessness of military alliances seemed callous, incredible and unrealistic (Sridharan 2001: 74). Lee reportedly told friends after talks with Indian officials that India was “living in a dream world” (Sridharan 1996: 40). The Indians however opposed security alliances or treaties a priori as part of Nehruvian strategic doctrine.   ((a big bullshit in the name of doctrine—sm))

The Singaporeans soon began to conclude that India did not have the material or moral wherewithal to extend its influence into Southeast Asia. Lee observed what he called a “gradual run-down of the country.”

India’s action was interpreted as proof of it toeing the Moscow-Hanoi line., and Singapore - India relations reached to their lowest point.

INDIA CHANGING

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 quickly led to a major reassessment by India of its political and economic relationship with Southeast Asia. In 1992, following a major balance of payments crisis, India launched its “Look East” policy, initially seeking to convince the Southeast Asians that India was now a welcoming environment for foreign investors. With the Cambodian and Afghanistan issues resolved, the Indians were also in a position to pitch for a security engagement with ASEAN, when Indian Prime Minister Rao declared in Singapore in 1994 that: “India would like to be part of the evolving security framework in the region to assuage doubts about arising from its potential military might as to contribute to the security edifice that was being crafted by the Asia-Pacific powers” (Sridharan 1996: 178).

Singapore, which itself was undergoing somewhat of a foreign policy reorientation, responded to India’s new policy with enthusiasm.

Singapore quickly positioned itself as India’s de facto regional sponsor and became central to India’s multilateral engagement in Southeast Asia. With Singapore’s political support, India was soon elevated to be a full ASEAN dialogue partner in December 1995 (slightly prior to China) and following Singapore’s hard lobbying of reluctant ASEAN members, India joined the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1996. India’s entry into the ARF reportedly involved a significant diplomatic effort by Singapore to overcome fears of importing the India-Pakistan dispute into the forum (Sridharan 2001: 76). When India was refused membership in the ASEAN plus 3 (China, Japan and South Korea) grouping in 2000, Singapore successfully lobbied for a separate India-ASEAN summit, which was held in November 2002 (Sridharan 2003: 28-9). 7 In 2005, Singapore (along with Japan and others) supported the inclusion of India in the first East Asian Summit, with Lee arguing that it “would be a useful balance to China’s heft” (Lee 2005). Unsurprisingly, Lee also supported the inclusion of India in any future Asian Economic Community, arguing that it would hold “expand the market” and lead to “more specialization and division of labour” (Suryanarayana 2005).

As well as acting as India’s gateway to Southeast Asia, the Singaporeans also believe that they can become a trade and financial intermediary between India and China (Yeo 2005). More generally, they believe they can assist in India’s development as an “economic balancer” to China. As Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong explained in 2004: “We see Singapore as being lifted by two economies. I visualize ASEAN as a fuselage of a jumbo plane with China as one wing, and India the other wing. If both wings take off, ASEAN as the fuselage will also be lifted. Singapore is part of this fuselage” (Ong 2004). Singapore has aggressively pursued economic ties with India since the opening of the Indian economy and the announcement of its Look East policy in Singapore in the early 1990s. Singapore has now become the largest investor in India among ASEAN states.

THE NEW ERA – POST 2014

 The new security partnership:- This actually, and realistically started after 2014, when Mr. MODI re-defined India’s Eastern Policy.

Our relationship with SINGAPORE grew in all respect, particularly in association of ARMED FORCES’ joint operations, and assistance to Singapore.

India and Singapore have developed a bilateral security and economic partnership that has a central position in India’s growing strategic engagement in Southeast Asia.

Singapore has now successfully positioned itself as India’s leading political partner and economic gateway to the region. The two have also actively pursued close defence ties, including frequent joint training and the assumption of an active regional maritime security role by India. The recent decision by India to allow the Singapore air force and army to operate long term training facilities on Indian territory also represents a significant development in Indian strategic practice.

WHAT INDIA LOST DUE TO CHACHA—BETI—(BLOGGER’S OPINION)

Possibly we could have set-up a Military base in Singapore in late sixties, with  presence of three wings of Armed Forces on it's soil. It is a GREAT LOSS, GEO-POLITICALLY.

References:-- Listed side by side of the text. For further reading see below :-

 Aneja, Atul (2000) “India, Vietnam partners in safeguarding sea lanes,” The Hindu, 15 April. The Arts, November/December 1995. Bernama (2006) (Malaysian News Agency), 3 June. Brecher, Michael (1968) India and World Politics: Krishna Menon’s View of the World, London: Oxford University Press. Brewster, David (2009) “India’s Strategic Partnership with Vietnam: The Search for a Diamond on the South China Sea?” Asian Security Vol.5, Issue 1, pp. 24-44. Chew, Emrys (2008) “A Merlion at the Edge of the Afrasian Sea: Singapore’s Strategic Involvement in the Indian Ocean” RSIS Working Paper No. 164. Curzon of Kedleston, Lord (1909) The Place of India in the Empire, London: John Murray. Devore, Sudhir (2006) India and Southeast Asia: Towards Security Convergence, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Dixit, J.N. (2004) Makers of India’s Foreign Policy: Raja Ram Mohun Roy to Yashwant Sinha, New Delhi: HarperCollins. Dutt, V.P. (1984) India’s Foreign Policy, New Delhi: Vani Educational Books. Goh Chok Tong (2005), “Constructing East Asia,” Speech to Asia Society, 15th Asian Corporate Conference, Bangkok, 9 June. 2