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INDIA’S EASTERN POLICY
SINGAPORE- 1947, AND BEYOND
NEHRUVIAN FOREIGN POLICY:
OPPORTUNITY LOST
SARASIJ MAJUMDER
BEFORE
1947
Singapore was founded by the British East India Company and
for the first 50 years of its settlement, it was under the direct
administration of British India. Even after Singapore was placed under separate colonial control, it was assumed
that British India would be primarily responsible for its security.
A broadly held acceptance prior to World War II was that the
“natural” strategic sphere of British India covered the Indian Ocean, running
from Aden to Singapore and beyond. Leading strategic thinkers from Lord Curzon
to K.M.Panikkar recognized the strategic importance of Singapore to India as
the eastern anchor of India’s maritime security and that India – whether
British-controlled or independent – would be a principal security provider to
Singapore (Curzon 1909; Panikkar 1943: 100-1).
The importance of Singapore as the eastern anchor to India’s
maritime security was played out when the fall of Singapore to the Japanese in
February 1942 (involving the surrender of some 40,000 Indian troops) was
followed by the capture of the Andaman Islands in the Bay of Bengal, followed
by the evacuation of the British fleet to Africa, exposing India’s entire
eastern seaboard to invasion. The Japanese for various reasons were unwilling
or unable to properly exploit this position. Mr. Subhash Chandra Bose , and INA
then took control.
AFTER
1947
The granting of independence to India in 1947 and the
subsequent decolonization of Southeast Asia led to a significant discontinuity
in India’s perception of the region. The Nehruvian political philosophy that
formed the foundation of Indian strategic doctrine largely eschewed a direct
security role for India outside of South Asia.
Nehru gave relations with Southeast Asia a particularly low
priority and in the Indian diplomatic service all postings in Southeast Asia
were classified as “category C”, the least desirable and important in the
diplomatic service hierarchy. At a 1961 meeting in New Delhi between Nehru and
the Indian ambassadors to Southeast Asia, when one senior diplomat suggested
that India should seek to nurture close relations with Southeast Asian, Nehru
reportedly cut the ambassador short, declaring: “Do you gentlemen wish to
become friendly with Coca Cola governments?” This reportedly ended any further
discussion on the subject (Dixit 2004: 12). Although Nehru’s Fabian socialist
disdain for the strategic concerns of Southeast Asian states was progressively
moderated under Indira Gandhi and successive Indian leaders, the basic temper
of the relationship had been established and would to some extent remain until
the early 1990s.
As a result--USA, and
later CHINA filled the VACUUM.
SINGAPORE’S
FOLLOW UP:
Singaporeans continued to recognise a legitimate role for
India as a regional security provider in what has been called Singapore’s
“survival phase” in the years following independence, Singapore saw itself as
being in a precarious strategic position, concerned not only with the prospect
of Communist Chinese supported internal subversion but also with external
threats posed by Indonesia and a potentially revanchist Malaysia. Singapore saw
India as potentially helping to maintain its new-found sovereignty against
infringements by China as well as its large neighbours. During the 1960s,
Singapore made several attempts to develop a security relationship with India.
However, while India was willing to provide diplomatic assistance to the newly
independent Singapore in developing international relations, it showed little,
or no interest in acting as a security provider (Lee 2000: 450).
In 1965, Lee Kuan Yew made a request to Indian Prime
Minister Shastri for Indian assistance in training the newly-established
Singapore army. The Indians declined to even respond to the request.
Ultimately, Singapore obtained support from ISRAEL.
In May 1968, following the announcement of the withdrawal of
the British navy from Singapore, Lee again unsuccessfully sought to encourage an Indian military
presence in Singapore, proposing to Indira Gandhi that the Indian navy should
take over the Royal Navy’s regional security role, including making use of
Singaporean naval dockyard facilities for the building and repair of ships
(Suryanarayan 2008). When, during a visit to India in 1970, Lee asked Indira
Gandhi whether India intended to extend its naval influence into Southeast
Asia, the Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh responded that India’s greater
interest was in keeping its western sea lanes open (Lee 2000: 452).
Following the first Chinese Lop Nur nuclear test in October
1964 – even before Singapore’s formal independence – the ever-quotable Lee Kuan
Yew reportedly suggested to visiting Indian dignitaries and journalists that
India should also explode a nuclear bomb, “at least for the sake of Southeast
Asia, even if she wanted to throw it into the sea later” (Dutt 1984: 256). In
1966, Lee proposed that India should adopt an “Asian Monroe Doctrine” to
prevent “poaching” in Asia. Lee added that India was the ideal candidate to fulfil
such as role because it conducted its foreign policy “on a basis of equality
and not on a basis of power relations”(Straits Times, 3 September 1966).
Singapore also reportedly tried to encourage India to join ASEAN upon its
formation in 1967, perhaps with a view to finding a balance with large states
within that grouping. However, other ASEAN states were not in favour of India’s inclusion.
India’s opposition to involvement in any regional security
mechanism puzzled the Singaporeans and others in Southeast Asia , particularly
in light of shared perceptions of a threat from China. To Southeast Asians, India’s persistent downplaying
of any idea of a power vacuum and statements about the uselessness of military
alliances seemed callous, incredible and unrealistic (Sridharan 2001: 74).
Lee reportedly told friends after talks with Indian officials that India was “living in a dream
world” (Sridharan 1996: 40). The Indians however opposed security
alliances or treaties a priori as part of Nehruvian strategic doctrine. ((a big bullshit in the name of doctrine—sm))
The Singaporeans soon began to conclude that India did not
have the material or moral wherewithal to extend its influence into Southeast
Asia. Lee observed what he called a “gradual run-down of the country.”
India’s action was interpreted as proof of it toeing the
Moscow-Hanoi line., and Singapore - India relations reached to their lowest
point.
INDIA CHANGING
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 quickly led to a
major reassessment by India of its political and economic relationship with
Southeast Asia. In 1992, following a major balance of payments crisis, India
launched its “Look East” policy, initially seeking to convince the Southeast
Asians that India was now a welcoming environment for foreign investors. With
the Cambodian and Afghanistan issues resolved, the Indians were also in a
position to pitch for a security engagement with ASEAN, when Indian Prime
Minister Rao declared in Singapore in 1994 that: “India would like to be part
of the evolving security framework in the region to assuage doubts about
arising from its potential military might as to contribute to the security
edifice that was being crafted by the Asia-Pacific powers” (Sridharan 1996:
178).
Singapore,
which itself was undergoing somewhat of a foreign policy reorientation,
responded to India’s new policy with enthusiasm.
Singapore quickly positioned itself as India’s de facto regional
sponsor and became central to India’s multilateral engagement in
Southeast Asia. With Singapore’s political support, India was soon elevated to
be a full ASEAN dialogue partner in December 1995 (slightly prior to China) and
following Singapore’s hard lobbying of reluctant ASEAN members, India joined
the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1996. India’s entry into the ARF reportedly
involved a significant diplomatic effort by Singapore to overcome fears of
importing the India-Pakistan dispute into the forum (Sridharan 2001: 76). When
India was refused membership in the ASEAN plus 3 (China, Japan and South Korea)
grouping in 2000, Singapore successfully lobbied for a separate India-ASEAN
summit, which was held in November 2002 (Sridharan 2003: 28-9). 7 In 2005,
Singapore (along with Japan and others) supported the inclusion of India in the
first East Asian Summit, with Lee arguing that it “would be a useful balance to
China’s heft” (Lee 2005). Unsurprisingly, Lee also supported the inclusion of
India in any future Asian Economic Community, arguing that it would hold
“expand the market” and lead to “more specialization and division of labour”
(Suryanarayana 2005).
As well as acting as India’s gateway to Southeast Asia, the
Singaporeans also believe that they can become a trade and financial
intermediary between India and China (Yeo 2005). More generally, they believe
they can assist in India’s development as an “economic balancer” to China. As
Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong explained in 2004: “We see Singapore as
being lifted by two economies. I visualize ASEAN as a fuselage of a jumbo plane
with China as one wing, and India the other wing. If both wings take off, ASEAN
as the fuselage will also be lifted. Singapore is part of this fuselage” (Ong
2004). Singapore has aggressively pursued economic ties with India since the
opening of the Indian economy and the announcement of its Look East policy in
Singapore in the early 1990s. Singapore has now become the largest investor in
India among ASEAN states.
THE NEW
ERA – POST 2014
Our relationship with SINGAPORE grew in all respect,
particularly in association of ARMED FORCES’ joint operations, and assistance to Singapore.
India and Singapore have developed a bilateral security and
economic partnership that has a central position in India’s growing strategic engagement
in Southeast Asia.
Singapore has now successfully positioned itself as India’s
leading political partner and economic gateway to the region. The two have also
actively pursued close defence ties, including frequent joint training and the
assumption of an active regional maritime security role by India. The recent
decision by India to allow the Singapore air force and army to operate long
term training facilities on Indian territory also represents a significant
development in Indian strategic practice.
WHAT INDIA LOST DUE TO CHACHA—BETI—(BLOGGER’S
OPINION)
Possibly we could have set-up
a Military base in Singapore in late sixties, with presence of three wings of Armed Forces on it's soil. It
is a GREAT LOSS, GEO-POLITICALLY.
References:-- Listed side by side
of the text. For further reading see below :-
Aneja, Atul (2000) “India, Vietnam partners in
safeguarding sea lanes,” The Hindu, 15 April. The Arts, November/December 1995.
Bernama (2006) (Malaysian News Agency), 3 June. Brecher, Michael (1968) India
and World Politics: Krishna Menon’s View of the World, London: Oxford
University Press. Brewster, David (2009) “India’s Strategic Partnership with
Vietnam: The Search for a Diamond on the South China Sea?” Asian Security
Vol.5, Issue 1, pp. 24-44. Chew, Emrys (2008) “A Merlion at the Edge of the
Afrasian Sea: Singapore’s Strategic Involvement in the Indian Ocean” RSIS
Working Paper No. 164. Curzon of Kedleston, Lord (1909) The Place of India in
the Empire, London: John Murray. Devore, Sudhir (2006) India and Southeast
Asia: Towards Security Convergence, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies. Dixit, J.N. (2004) Makers of India’s Foreign Policy: Raja Ram Mohun
Roy to Yashwant Sinha, New Delhi: HarperCollins. Dutt, V.P. (1984) India’s
Foreign Policy, New Delhi: Vani Educational Books. Goh Chok Tong (2005),
“Constructing East Asia,” Speech to Asia Society, 15th Asian Corporate
Conference, Bangkok, 9 June. 2
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Oh/, what an analysis!
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