MALDIV FILES

CHINESE CHECKER IN BACKYARD OF INDIA

INDIA WAS SOFT 

SARASIJ MAJUMDER

India was among the countries that recognized Maldives as an independent nation after its independence. India became the first country to open its mission in Male in 1965. There are two factions in Maldivian politics, one of which is inclined towards India and the other towards China. Election is over in Maldives. A considerable time elapsed. President Muizzu is in control. Let us now review the political balance sheet.

1.      It is often the case that smaller but strategically important nations become the stage of competition between bigger powers vying for regional supremacy. The Republic of Maldives or simply, Maldives, isn't an exception. The Indian Ocean archipelago has a population of less than half a million and the cumulative land area doesn't even hit the 300 square kilometres mark. But its proximity to vital internal maritime trade routes and involvement in Sino-Indian rivalry has always kept Maldives in geopolitical focus. The result of the presidential election and the victory of pro-China candidate Mohamed Muizzu has again made the Maldives hit global headlines and made foreign policy mandarins across the world turn heads and take notice.

2.      India’s initial reaction was “WAIT  AND WATCH”. It didn’t yield favourable result.

3.      Debt trap or not, China has a proven track record of rapid completion of infrastructure projects. This has enabled it to win major initial brownie points among underdeveloped nations in Asia and Africa which are more concerned about the fulfilment of their very basic requirements than speculative analysis of global geopolitics. India has stepped up its game surely, but it remains notoriously slow when it comes to such endeavors. India needs to fine-tune its game on this front to match its strategic ambitions with actual delivery. China has a decisive advantage as its pockets are much deeper than India's. India needs to play wisely in order to not overstretch.

4.      Another important thing, especially in the South Asian context, is the Indian notion of being the 'big brother'. The unease among SAARC nations, barring Pakistan, about Indian assertiveness during striking deals is somewhat common knowledge.

5.      India needs to examine if years of such manoeuvres have had a cumulative effect on the formation of a clear anti-India sentiment among political elites in South Asian countries which previously were seen to have firm, favourable ties with India. For a shrewd politician in search of a political plank in these countries, blaming an entrenched India has the potential of getting him limelight. Such a poll pitch may even find resonance among the public, much like anti-incumbency but in this limited context, a foreign power that is India. Has this happened in the Maldives? More ground reporting may be necessary to conclusively say that.

6.      For India, losing military establishment in the Maldives can prove costly, especially in the light of the Chinese strategy of 'String of Pearls'. Eliminating Indian influence from South Asia outright may be an impossible goal. However, developments over the last two decades have shown that China has steadily encroached and made gains in India's backyard.

7.      In diminishing Indian importance in the Indian Ocean region, China is seeking to create a bulwark against possible Indian strategy (in theory) of blocking the Strait of Malacca which can choke China's oil supply in the event of a war. Not many years ago, this was seen as an ace in Indian hands and a deterrent against Chinese aggression by land across India's northern border. With China seeking to firm up its presence in South Asia and in the Indian Ocean region, the effectiveness of the Malacca Strait strategy suddenly appears diminished.

8.      Present developments in Maldives are therefore not to be taken lightly. After Hambantota, India can simply not afford the formation of a Chinese base, even with a commercial façade, in waters that bears “INDIAN” name.

9.      In retrospect, it seems we have not handled the crisis in MALDIVES to our advantage in the past.

10. From 1988, Maldives sent signals of anti- India SENTIMENT. Taking over Maldives was an option, with a firm PUPPET Dictator in place. However-- it was easier said than done, with our weak Governments of that period, and "TOUCH NOT MUSLIM" policy..

Source:--

1.0  Data, and Information:--HT/IE

2.0 Image:- Internet